Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18315
Authors: 
Inderst, Roman
Wey, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 464
Abstract: 
This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers´ incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers´incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates two di¤erent channels by which larger buyers can obtain a discount.
Subjects: 
Buyer power ; Merger ; Retailing
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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