Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18266 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 282
Publisher: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Abstract: 
Institutional change is guided by rules. In the European Union these rules are given by Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. These articles define the actors and rules that bring about changes in policies in the European Union. We analyze these articles as games in extensive form and characterize and compare the equilibria of these games. This analysis identifies the decisive actors the conditions under which it comes to institutional change within the European Union. In addition we analyze the tendencies for centralization inherent in these decision procedures as well as their ability to come up with solutions that are a good compromise between all actors.
Subjects: 
endogenous institutional change
law and economics
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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