Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/182223 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1752
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of "taxpayers" vote for the public transfer.
Schlagwörter: 
stigma
signaling
redistribution
non take-up
welfare program
JEL: 
C91
D03
H31
I38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
795.39 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.