Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/182000
Authors: 
Hunold, Matthias
Kesler, Reinhold
Laitenberger, Ulrich
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 300
Abstract: 
We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions in their search results if these set lower hotel prices at other OTAs or on their own websites. We formally characterize how an OTA can use such a strategy to reduce price differentiation across distribution channels. Our empirical analysis shows that the position of a hotel in the search results of OTAs is better when the prices charged by the hotel on other channels are higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that OTAs alter their search results to discipline hotels for aggressive prices on competing channels, and by this reduce search quality for consumers.
Subjects: 
consumer protection
free-riding
hotel booking
online travel agents
ranking
search bias
JEL: 
D40
L42
L81
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-299-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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