Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181620 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Experiments - Public Goods No. F17-V2
Verlag: 
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.
Schlagwörter: 
Laboratory experiment
public good
democracy
endogenous institutions
voting
contribution rule
compliance
JEL: 
C91
D02
D72
K42
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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