Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181599 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Public Goods and Public Economics No. B19-V1
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
We examine how leadership affects a dynamic public goods game. Using a setting where cooperation gains can be reinvested, our findings suggest that leadership has a positive impact on final wealth. Somewhat surprisingly, leadership also has a positive impact on reducing inequality within groups as measured by the Gini index. Based on a sequential prisoner's dilemma, we elicit types for conditional cooperation. Our results indicate that groups work best when led by cooperatively inclined individuals. Furthermore, early contributions by the leader are crucial and yield a high return.
Subjects: 
Leadership
Public Goods Game
Conditional Cooperation
Inequality
Growth
Lab Experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
D63
C72
C92
H41
D63
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.