Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180886
Authors: 
Mehta, Nirav
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CHCP Working Paper 2017-8
Abstract: 
This note examines the potential output gains from the implementation of optimal teacher incentive pay schemes, by calibrating the Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987) hidden action model using data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), a teacher incentive pay experiment implemented in Andhra Pradesh, India. Findings suggest that the introduction of optimal individual incentive-pay schemes could result in very large increases in output, about six times the size of the (significant) results obtained in the experiment.
Subjects: 
hidden action
empirical contracts
teacher incentive pay
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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