Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179478
Authors: 
Diller, Markus
Lorenz, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe No. B-29-17
Abstract: 
We propose a game theoretical model where a multinational company with divisions in two countries and the respective tax authorities interact with each other. Prior to an audit the functional profile of the divisions is unknown to the tax authorities. In equilibrium, tax avoidance emerges in both countries. It turns out that the audit pressure is highest for firms with a hybrid functional profile, dampening their production and reducing their after-tax profit. We find that introducing a bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement reduces tax avoidance by aggressive transfer pricing in the high-tax ("domestic") country and precludes tax avoidance in the lowtax ("foreign") country. The volume of production increases. The foreign tax authority discontinues its audit activities, while the domestic tax authority audits less often at least if the foreign division is a toll manufacturer ("routine function"). While the expected net tax revenues increase in the foreign country, they may decrease in the domestic country.
Subjects: 
transfer pricing
tax evasion
cooperation
JEL: 
H26
F23
K34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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