Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171592 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 11/149
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
central banks
incentive contracts
transparency
inflation targeting
inflation forecast targeting
intermediate targets
JEL: 
E58
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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