Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171229
Authors: 
Hafner, Lucas
Reif, Simon
Seebauer, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 18/2017
Abstract: 
Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party representing the health insurance which finances medical service provision. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical services. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.
Subjects: 
health economic experiment
framing
physician behavior
prospective payment schemes
JEL: 
C91
C93
I11
I18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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