Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/169412
Authors: 
Emch, Eric
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Zhou, Arthur
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 270
Abstract: 
We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies' and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and easier to implement. Our analysis suggests that over time this distinction has become somewhat blurred and a better gradation of remedies may be tied to the complexity of the proposed remedy. Divestitures in the market for generic drugs, in particular, are particularly complex, even though the remedies are of a structural, and so their efficacy is hard to ascertain.
Subjects: 
Antitrust
Mergers
Structural Remedies
Behavioral Remedies
U.S. Enforcement
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-269-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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