Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168286
Authors: 
Englmaier, Florian
Grimm, Stefan
Schindler, David
Schudy, Simeon
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Applied Microeconomics III G01-V2
Abstract: 
Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers’ willingness to “explore” original solutions.
Subjects: 
team work
bonus
incentives
loss
gain
non-routine
exploration
JEL: 
C92
C93
J33
D03
M52
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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