Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168207
Authors: 
Maier, Carl G.
Marencak, Michal
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Mechanism Design C09-V1
Abstract: 
Empirical evidence shows that low cost of signaling interest in offers can result in a significant number of inappropriate signals. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for this observation as an equilibrium outcome of a model with utility maximizing fully rational agents that decide to signal their interest without knowing whether the offer suits them or not. We show that falling transaction costs can decrease market efficiency and social welfare.
JEL: 
C72
D47
D83
E24
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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