Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168187
Authors: 
Wagner, Alexander K.
Granic, Dura-Georg
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Voting C20-V2
Abstract: 
We investigate the effects of voting power in a committee in which one member (the chairman) holds, on top of a regular vote, also the power to break ties. The chairman is able to induce her preferred outcome much more often than predicted by theory, but only partially because of exercising tie-breaking power directly. The advantage of the chairman is largely determined by the limited strategic sophistication of committee members.
JEL: 
C91
C92
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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