Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168163
Authors: 
Köppl-Turyna, Monika
Kantorowicz, Jarosław
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Institutions B20-V2
Abstract: 
We apply the difference-in-discontinuities design to disentangle the fiscal effects the governance system conditional on electoral systems. We take advantage of a natural experiment, which involves two institutional reforms in Poland. Our results indicate that a change from parliamentary to presidential form led to lower vertical fiscal imbalance predominantly in the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections and to a lesser extent in municipalities governed by proportional elections.
JEL: 
D72
D78
H72
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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