Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168161
Authors: 
Richardson, Martin
Stähler, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: International Economics G14-V3
Abstract: 
We develop a model in which it is uncertainty about the future domestic policy environment that both makes international cooperation attractive and induces the possibility of a nation reneging on such an international agreement. We show, in a fairly general setting that the possibility of exit reduces the optimal degree of initial cooperation. "Full" cooperation will never be optimal, and the optimal degree of cooperation will never be such as to "squeeze out" any possibility of exit.
JEL: 
F53
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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