Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168155
Authors: 
Maaser, Nicola
Traub, Stefan
Paetzel, Fabian
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games II B18-V3
Abstract: 
In real world bargaining the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect real power. Game-theory predictions are insensitive to nominal differences. We refer to the converse idea that nominal differences matter as power illusion. We experimentally study the Baron-Ferejohn model with variation in nominal power. We find strong evidence for the existence of power illusion. Thus, attention needs to be paid to nominal power in the design of weighted voting systems.
JEL: 
D72
C92
C7
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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