Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168153
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Eichenseer, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Environmental Economics, Natural Resources and Climate Change II C17-V3
Abstract: 
From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology.
JEL: 
C72
H41
O31
Q54
Q55
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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