Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168151
Authors: 
Laske, Katharina
Schröder, Marina
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Organization and Firms II B01-V3
Abstract: 
We introduce a novel experimental design in which creativity is incentivized and measured along three dimensions: quantity, quality and originality of ideas. We implement piece rate incentives for quantity alone, quantity in combination with quality and quantity in combination with originality and compare the results to a baseline with a fixed wage. Studying the effect of incentives on performance in the separate dimensions of creativity, we find that incentives significantly affect the quantity and average quality of ideas, but not the average originality. We show that incentives have both positive direct and negative spillover effects on performance in these dimensions and that organizations, therefore, face tradeoffs when introducing incentives for creative performance. When investigating the effect of incentives on a combined measure of innovation, i.e., the number of creative ideas that are at the same time of high quality and original, we find that incentives for both quantity and originality perform best.
Subjects: 
creativity
multitasking
laboratory experiment
real-effort
incentives
JEL: 
C91
J33
M52
O30
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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