Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168149
Authors: 
Butschek, Sebastian
Kampkötter, Patrick
Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Organization and Firms II B01-V1
Abstract: 
We study the compensation of gig workers in a natural field experiment. To derive testable predictions, this paper presents a formal model capturing a central feature of online freelance work: gig work- ers' ability to choose both how much to work and how big an e¤ort to make. We analyse the set-up in a principal-agent model, showing that the optimal contract includes a sales-based commission and uses a gig-based piece rate to insure a risk-averse agent. This piece rate is in- creasing in her risk aversion, intrinsic motivation and ability. We then predict the e¤ects of introducing a gig piece rate while reducing the commission rate. The effects on the agents' choices of quantity and quality are heterogeneous in their risk aversion, intrinsic motivation and ability.
Subjects: 
Incentives
Risk Aversion
Intrinsic Motivation
Sales Compensation
Multitasking
Field Experiment
JEL: 
M52
J33
D23
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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