Butschek, Sebastian Kampkötter, Patrick Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication:
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Organization and Firms II B01-V1
We study the compensation of gig workers in a natural field experiment. To derive testable predictions, this paper presents a formal model capturing a central feature of online freelance work: gig work- ers' ability to choose both how much to work and how big an e¤ort to make. We analyse the set-up in a principal-agent model, showing that the optimal contract includes a sales-based commission and uses a gig-based piece rate to insure a risk-averse agent. This piece rate is in- creasing in her risk aversion, intrinsic motivation and ability. We then predict the e¤ects of introducing a gig piece rate while reducing the commission rate. The effects on the agents' choices of quantity and quality are heterogeneous in their risk aversion, intrinsic motivation and ability.
Incentives Risk Aversion Intrinsic Motivation Sales Compensation Multitasking Field Experiment