Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168085
Authors: 
Schumacher, Heiner
Thysen, Heidi
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Contract Theory G09-V1
Abstract: 
We study an informed-principal framework in which the principal chooses the variables the agent is aware of. The agent fits a causal model connecting these variables to the objective probability distribution. The principal may keep her unaware of some variables so that she incorrectly extrapolates how non-equilibrium actions map into outcomes. This framework captures models of contracting with unaware agents, shrouded attributes, and overconfidence in a unified manner.
JEL: 
D03
D82
D86
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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