Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168084
Authors: 
Braun, Julia
Zagler, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Postersession P00-V3
Abstract: 
Nash bargaining model shows that a deal is struck only if both countries mutually benefit. • The model predicts voluntary signature of asymmetric double tax agreements only if there is compensation for the capital importer. Empirical evidence indicates that foreign aid from the capital exporter to the capital importer increases on average by 6 million USD In the signature year of a double tax agreement
JEL: 
H2
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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