Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168083
Authors: 
Fehrler, Sebastian
Fischbacher, Urs
Schneider, Maik
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Experiments - Games I A02-V2
Abstract: 
We examine the incentives to self-select into politics. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party’s nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model’s key predictions, we find that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race.
JEL: 
C92
D71
D83
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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