Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168058
Authors: 
Pichler, Paul
Sorger, Gerhard
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Environmental Economics, Natural Resources and Climate Change I A17-V3
Abstract: 
We study the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority. We demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses. The losses can be kept small if the mandate of the authority penalizes the local cost of emissions heavily, but puts little or no weight on the cost of climate change. The design of the authority's mandate creates another dynamic inconsistency because the countries face a recurrent incentive to modify it.
JEL: 
F53
H87
O33
Q43
Q54
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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