Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163563
Authors: 
Kantorowicz, Jarosław
Köppl-Turyna, Monika
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Agenda Austria Working Paper 06
Abstract: 
We apply the difference-in-discontinuities design to disentangle the fiscal effects of the governance system conditional on electoral systems. We take advantage of a natural experiment, which involves two institutional reforms at the local level in Poland. The first reform introduced two electoral rules, which change along an exogenous population threshold: smaller municipalities use majoritarian elections, larger municipalities use proportional elections. The second reform changed the governance system in Polish municipalities from “parliamentary” to “presidential”. Our results indicate that a change from parliamentary to presidential form led to lower vertical fiscal imbalance predominantly in the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections and to a lesser extent in municipalities governed by proportional elections. This therefore confirms an interaction effect between the forms of government and electoral rules.
Subjects: 
electoral rules
vertical fiscal imbalance
constitutions
JEL: 
D72
D78
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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