Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163485
Authors: 
Congdon, Tim
Goodhart, Charles A.E.
Eisenbeis, Robert A.
Kaufman, George G.
Hamalainen, Paul
Lastra, Rosa M.
Llewellyn, David T.
Mayes, David G.
Wood, Geoffrey
Milne, Alastair
Onado, Marco
Taylor, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SUERF Studies 2009/1
Abstract: 
In August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over 140 years. Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. In fact, ten years earlier it had converted from a mutual building society whose activities were limited by regulation largely to retail deposits and mortgages. Graphic television news pictures showed very long queues outside the bank as depositors rushed to withdraw their deposits. There was always a fear that this could spark a systemic run on bank deposits. After failed attempts to secure a buyer in the private sector, the government nationalised the bank and, for the first time, in effect socialised the credit risk of the bank. It is now a fully state-owned bank...
Subjects: 
Northern Rock
retail banking
mortgages
nationalisation
bank failure
United Kingdom
LPHI risk
lender of last resort
deposit insurance
market discipline
Countrywide
IndyMac
United States
deposit guarantees
supervisory failure
bank regulation
return on equity
business model
securitisation
financial regulation
financial stability
crisis management
banking law
insolvency
emergency liquidity assistance
cross-border bank insolvency
moral hazard
penalty rates
teaser rates
capital-asset ratios
Basel I
Basel II
JEL: 
D14
D18
D4
E21
E5
E51
E53
E58
G18
G2
G21
G28
G32
G33
G34
G38
K2
L1
L5
L51
ISBN: 
978-3-902109-46-0
Document Type: 
Proceedings

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