Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/153656 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1222
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
From the onset of the 2007-2009 crisis, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have aggressively lowered interest rates. Both sets of changes are at odds with an anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy; indeed, as the crisis began in August 2007 inflation expectations were high and rising, particularly in the United States. We have two additions to the literature. One, we present a model economy with a leveraged and regulated financial sector. Two, we find optimal Taylor rules for our economy that are consistent with a strong pro-inflationary reaction during financial crisis while maintaining a standard output-inflation mandate. We have three interpretations of our results. One, because the Federal Reserve has partial control over bank regulation it can exercise regulatory lenience. Two, the Fed’s stronger output orientation means that it will potentially respond more quickly when faced with constrained banks. Three, our results support procyclical capital regulation.
Schlagwörter: 
capital regulation
crisis
monetary policy
JEL: 
E52
E58
G18
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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