Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/153572 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 1138
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. We show that a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach is to cap interchange fees based on retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provide credit themselves. In the model, this always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, sometimes to the point of maximizing consumer surplus.
Schlagwörter: 
credit card networks
credit card pricing
interchange fees
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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