Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/152558 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 124
Publisher: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Full commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. Different types of reactions functions to implement and instrument rules to approximate full commitment have been proposed in the literature. We assess optimal reaction functions and instrument rules, in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. The reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs best on both counts.
JEL: 
E52
E31
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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