Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/152558 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 124
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Full commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. Different types of reactions functions to implement and instrument rules to approximate full commitment have been proposed in the literature. We assess optimal reaction functions and instrument rules, in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. The reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs best on both counts.
JEL: 
E52
E31
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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