Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149898
Authors: 
Baake, Pio
Harasser, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 1635
Abstract: 
We analyze a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream retailers. Demand is uncertain but each retailer receives an informative private signal about the state of the demand. We construct an incentive compatible and ex ante balanced mechanism which induces the retailers to share their information truthfully. Information sharing can be profitable for the retailers but is likely to be detrimental for social welfare.
Subjects: 
information sharing
upstream monopoly
vertical relations
JEL: 
D82
L13
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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