Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/146900 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1607
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a novel theory of corruption in public procurement. It considers an agency setting of contract execution where the principal is a politician who can commit to a contract auditing policy. It is found that a benevolent politician, by choosing a sufficiently strict auditing, deters the contracting firm from padding costs, conversely, a selfish politician chooses a relatively lax auditing in order to create an incentive for cost-padding, and engages in corruption with the firm in case of detection. If the cost of auditing is high enough, even a benevolent politician might prefer to allow cost-padding.
Schlagwörter: 
Corruption in procurement
Cost-padding
Selfish politician
Endogenous auditing
Procurement contracts
Principal-agent model
JEL: 
D73
D82
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
586.94 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.