Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146715
Authors: 
Ciarreta, Aitor
Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 40 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 247-254
Abstract: 
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.
Subjects: 
optimal punishments
detection lags
collusion sustainability
JEL: 
C73
D43
Document Type: 
Article

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