Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142633 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EERI Research Paper Series No. 04/2012
Verlag: 
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels
Zusammenfassung: 
Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of risk-sharing and moral hazard is far from settled. Moreover, existing empirical study very often plague by selection problem. We address both issues using data from rural Bangladesh. This paper tested a model empirically where the leasing decision and contract choice are simultaneous. A modified Heckman model is estimated which avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts. Empirical tests reject the hypothesis of pure risk sharing and a wide range of support for the presence of moral hazard problem in the choice of contracts.
Schlagwörter: 
Contract choice
Heckman model
Moral hazard
Risk
Sharecropping
JEL: 
Q15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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