Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/142621 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EERI Research Paper Series No. 14/2011
Verlag: 
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels
Zusammenfassung: 
Societies in Western civilisation enforce their rules through formal institutions such as secularism (SES), whereas in less developed civilisations often rely on informal institutions such as religion (RES). The present paper attempts to explain the determinants of societies’ choice between different enforcement systems, and their implications for society development using an example of two different enforcement models: one informal (RES) and one formal (SES). We find that, because the RES is based on beliefs, its efficiency depends heavily on its credibility, making it little flexible and highly susceptible to conflicts in dynamic environments. In contrast, because under the SES societal rules are enforced through a formal legal enforcement sector, the SES is more flexible though also more costly than the RES. The empirical evidence strongly supports our findings that wealthy, dynamic and fast growing economies typically choose the SES for enforcing societal norms and rules.
Schlagwörter: 
Enforcement institutions
economic growth
conflicts
religion
secularism
JEL: 
B15
E02
E11
O43
O44
P37
B52
Z12
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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