Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142487
Authors: 
Martins, Ana Paula
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
EERI Research Paper Series 05/2002
Abstract: 
This note suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players.
Subjects: 
Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cooperative Games Maximands
Opportunism
Pessimism
JEL: 
C71
D39
D74
H56
J51
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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