Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141906 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Contemporary Economics [ISSN:] 2084-0845 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Vizja Press & IT [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 215-231
Verlag: 
Vizja Press & IT, Warsaw
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a model of adverse selection, hard and soft information, and mentalizing ability-the human capacity to represent others' intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. By allowing for a continuous range of different information types, as well as for different means of acquiring information, we develop a model that captures how principals differentially obtain information on agents. We show that principals that combine conventional data collection techniques with mentalizing benefit from a synergistic effect that impacts both the amount of information that is accessed and the overall cost of that information. This strategy affects the properties of the optimal contract, which grows closer to the first best. This research provides insights into the implications of mentalizing for agency theory.
Schlagwörter: 
Adverse selection
mentalizing
hard information
soft information
contract
JEL: 
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.33 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.