Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141337 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Volume:] 94 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 133-141
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Die EZB-Targetsalden der Mitgliedsländer der Europäischen Währungsunion haben sich im Verlauf der Schuldenkrise sehr unterschiedlich entwickelt. Vor allem Deutschland ist hier in eine Gläubigerposition geraten, während die Krisenländer hohe Defizite aufweisen. Der Autor untersucht hier nicht ihre fiskalischen (Haftungs-)Wirkungen, sondern ihre geld- und währungspolitischen Konsequenzen.
Abstract (Translated): 
The Target2 balances of the ESCB have become a focus of scholarly discussion. Triggered by a loss of international competitiveness and subsequent current account deficits in the EMU's periphery states, they now constitute a default risk for the core states. But there is more to it: balance of payment disequilibria in a currency union are supposed to trigger money supply flows from surplus countries to deficit countries. Since they form the basis for readjustments in relative prices and competitiveness, they must not be neutralised by monetary policy. The ECB's Target2 balances create precisely this neutralisation and thus undermine the self-adjusting mechanism of the EMU.
JEL: 
E58
F15
F41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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