Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130786
Authors: 
Fernandes, Marcelo
Novaes, Walter
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London 772
Abstract: 
The subprime crisis led to a wave of government interventions in the private sector that has been particularly strong in Europe and Latin America, where several governments are large shareholders in a variety of public firms. In a sense, the subprime crisis induced these governments to behave as active large shareholders. This paper uses a sample of public firms in Brazil to show that government activism lowers the value of minority shareholders' voting rights. While the corporate governance literature usually associates lower voting premia with stronger protection of minority shareholders, we provide evidence that the government-induced decline in the value of voting rights harmed minority shareholders in Brazil.
Subjects: 
Interventionism
Monitoring
Private benefits
Voting premium
JEL: 
G14
G18
G30
G38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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