Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129800
Authors: 
Feld, Lars P.
Ruf, Martin
Schreiber, Ulrich
Todtenhaupt, Maximilian
Voget, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik 16/03
Abstract: 
Taxing capital gains is an important obstacle to the efficient allocation of resources because it imposes a transaction cost on the vendor which locks in appreciated assets by raising the vendor's reservation price in prospective transactions. For M&As, this effect has been intensively studied with regard to share-holder taxation, whereas empirical evidence on the effect of capital gains taxes paid by corporations is scarce. This paper analyzes how corporate level taxation of capital gains affects inter-corporate M&As. Studying several substantial tax reforms in a panel of 30 countries for the period of 2002-2013, we identify a significant lock-in effect. Results from estimating a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) model suggest that a one percentage point decrease in the corporate capital gains tax rate would raise both the number and the total deal value of acquisitions by about 1.1% per year. We use this result to estimate an efficiency loss resulting from corporate capital gains taxation of 3.06 bn USD per year in the United States.
Subjects: 
corporate taxation
M&A
capital gains tax
lock-in effect
JEL: 
H25
G34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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