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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 03/2014
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents' incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents' efforts are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. I solve for the optimal monetary incentives that complement the peer effects and show that the principal prefers sequential effort choices of the agents to choosing efforts simultaneously.
Schlagwörter: 
externalities
moral hazard
other-regarding preferences
JEL: 
C72
D03
D86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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