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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Trinity Economic Papers Series, Technical Paper No. 1998,1
Verlag: 
Trinity College, Department of Economics, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper formalises the choice a firm has to face when entering a foreign market via FDI as between setting up an entirely new plant (greenfield investment) or acquiring an existing indigenous firm. Our results show that in an asymmetric duopoly situation a new entrant will normally be best off by acquiring an existing indigenous low-technology firm, thus, forming a duopoly with an indigenous high-technology firm. While in welfare terms the entry of the foreign firm damages the country in most cases, there exist some possibilities that welfare, particularly after a greenfield investment by the foreign firm, is higher than before entry, even when there is full profit repatriation.
JEL: 
F23
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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