Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127443
Authors: 
Baake, Pio
Harasser, Andreas
Heiny, Friederike
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 1543
Abstract: 
We analyze a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer's incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, the supplier will choose to acquire information only if the retailer is rather well informed, even though the information is free of charge.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
information acquisition
vertical relations
JEL: 
D82
D83
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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