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Deconinck, Koen
Huysmans, Martijn
Swinnen, Johan
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
LICOS Discussion Paper Series 372
In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant's optimum and the government's optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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