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Autoren: 
Pichler, Stefan
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
Datum: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KOF Working Papers No. 394
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the test exploiting German sick pay reforms and administrative industry-level data on certified sick leave by diagnoses. The labor supply adjustment for contagious diseases is significantly smaller than for non-contagious diseases. Lastly, using Google Flu data and the staggered implementation of US sick leave reforms, we show that flu rates decrease after employees gain access to paid sick leave
Schlagwörter: 
Sickness Insurance
Paid Sick Leave
Presenteeism
Contagious Diseases
Infections
Negative Externalities
Shirking
US
Germany
JEL: 
I12
I13
I18
J22
J28
J32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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