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Autoren: 
Clougherty, Joseph
Duso, Tomaso
Lee, Miyu
Seldeslachts, Jo
Datum: 
2015
Reihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 1523
Zusammenfassung: 
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
Schlagwörter: 
merger
deterrence
European Commission
merger policy
competition policy
antitrust
JEL: 
K21
K40
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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