Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125136
Authors: 
Dold, Malte
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik, Universität Freiburg 2015-07
Abstract: 
The objective of this note is to revisit the meaningfulness of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and apply it to the recent debate on liberal paternalism and consumer protection. The CJT con-sists of two parts, (a) stating that a jury of experts is always more competent than a single expert given a certain level of competence, and (b) asserting that for large juries, the collective com-petence approaches infallibility. This note argues that these insights suggest the application of a Condorcet jury voting procedure to the case of nudging boundedly rational consumers. The note proposes a simple calculus for finding an optimal jury size and advocates consumers' meta-preferences as the jury's evaluative dimension for designing soft paternalistic policies.
Subjects: 
Bounded Rationality
Condorcet Jury Theorem
Consumer Policy
Educative Nudges
Hierarchical Preferences
Knowledge Problem
Liberal Paternalism
JEL: 
B41
D03
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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