Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123815
Authors: 
White, Eugene N.
Bodenhorn, Howard
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2014-04
Abstract: 
Contemporary bank governance is criticized for manager-dominated (insider) boards of directors, but from the beginning of the nineteenth century, bank presidents appear also to have operated as chairmen of the boards of directors. However, the managers were constrained by a variety of rules that tended to align the interests of management, shareholders and other stakeholders until the mid-twentieth century. We trace this development through New York banking law and new data on banks chartered by the State of New York.
Subjects: 
corporate governance
board of directors
bank history
JEL: 
G21
G3
N21
N22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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