Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123109
Authors: 
Reischmann, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Ifo Working Paper 201
Abstract: 
Using an unbalanced panel of 27 OECD countries over the period 1970–2011, I examinewhether electoral motives influenced creative accounting. Governments engage in“below-the-line” operations, such as transactions in financial assets, that do not show upin the deficit figures but give rise to changes in debt. I use the difference between thechange in public debt and the deficit (stock-flow adjustment) to measure creativeaccounting. The results suggest that governments strategically engaged in creativeaccounting before regular elections so as to sugarcoat the budget balance. I also providean overview of government interventions that gave rise to large stock-flow adjustments.
Subjects: 
Stock-flow adjustments
creative accounting
public debt
political business cycles
JEL: 
C23
D72
E62
H61
H62
H63
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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