Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122143
Authors: 
Wärneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 749
Abstract: 
A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.
Subjects: 
rent seeking
contests
hierarchy
ownership of firms
JEL: 
D23
D74
G32
G34
L22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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